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MUNICIPAL TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICE ur 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE 
IN CQOPERATION WITH THE TENNESSEE MUNICIPAL LEAGUE 
January 10, 1990 
FIRE (AND POLICE) DEPARTMENT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT RESPONSE 
by Sidney D. Hemsley 
Under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act municipalities are liable for the negligence of 
their employees, with some exceptions. One of those exceptions is "discretionary functions" 
(Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) 29-20-205). However, the act does not define that term. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court recently grappled with both a definition and application of the term 
in Gordon, et al. v. City of Henderson, 766 S.W.2d 784 (1988). Although that case involved the 
delivery of municipal fire services, it contains some language that should cause Tennessee 
municipalities to look closely at the way they deliver all public safety services. 
Several plaintiffs sued the City of Henderson on the grounds that the negligence of the 
Henderson Fire Department was responsible for the death of four persons. They complained 
that: 
1. The firemen were absent from their duty stations and had to be located by the 
Henderson Police Department; 
2. The response time of the firemen was fifteen minutes when it should have been 
five minutes; 
3. Some of the responding firemen had the smell of liquor on their breaths and 
were "unable to respond as trained and professional firemen;" 
4. The firemen incorrectly placed their equipment in operation. 
The plaintiffs never got an opportunity to prove their case. The Court dismissed their 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of 
Appeals upheld the dismissal, reasoning that the four acts of which the plaintiffs complained 
were "discretionary functions" for which the City of Henderson was not liable under the 
Tennessee Tort Liability Act. 
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The Court of Appeals was at least partially wrong, declared the Tennessee Supreme 
Court. The Court noted that while the Tennessee Tort Liability Act does not define the term 
"discretionary function," it had previously defined the term under the common law as: 
Where the duty is absolute, certain,4 and imperative, and is simply 
ministerial, the officer is liable in damages to any one specially 
injured, either by his omitting to perform the task· or by performing 
it negligently or unskillfully. On t,he other hand, where his powers 
are discretionary, and to be )l<e'rted or withheld according to his 
own judgment, he is not liable to any private person for a neglect 
to exercise those powe.r-S, nor for the consequences of a willful 
exercise of them, where no corruption or malice can be imputed to 
him, and he keeps within the scope of his authority. 
Under that definition, the Court concluded that "while upon a full development of the 
facts, some of the acts of the firemen complained of could logically be classified as 
"discretionary functions," 
... we find it difficult to categorize the apparent intoxication of 
firemen as a 'discretionary function,' nor, without an explanation 
of defendants, the absence of firemen from their duty station and 
the resultant delay in response time. 
The Court relied in part on an Alabama Supreme Court opinion that a plaintiff was 
entitled to a trial on the question whether the City of Tuscumbia was liable for a house 
destroyed by a fire. The plaintiff in that case alleged the fire was caused by a delay in the 
response of the fire department arising from the failure of the fire department to replace an 
engine driver who had gone home sick. The deployment of firefighting resources can involve 
a discretionary function, said the Alabama Supreme Court, but: 
We opine that in this case a duty was imposed on the Tuscumbia 
Fire Department to respond immediately to the call that the 
[plaintiff's] house was on fire. There was a special duty created to · 
act in a skillful manner to respond to the call. We recognize that 
firemen may act with extreme skillfulness and yet be unable to get 
to a fire to prevent a building from burning to the ground. But, 
here the complaint alleges that the reason the fire department did 
not immediately respond was that the driver of the truck had gone 
home sick and had not been replaced. We opine that the fire 
department acted unskillfully by not having a back-up driver who 
could have immediately taken the place of the sick driver; ... in other 
words, the fire department lacked proficiency. 
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First, the Court's application of its definition of "discretionary function" narrows, and 
has the potential to lead to a further judicial narrowing of the range of acts on the part of 
low-ranking and non-policy making employees that can be classed as "discretionary 
functions." At first glance it may seem both l�gally sound and just to declare that the 
intoxication of firemen or their absence from their duty stations are not "discretionary 
functions." But that declaration may open a Pandora's Box of complaints concerning the 
individual and collective mental and physical condition of 'public safety personnel, and 
staffing and deployment decisions that affect t):leir response times and the quality of their 
service. The Court appears to have left some deployment decision within the category of 
"discretionary functions." But it takes little imagination to see that the Court's language is 
an invitation to test every deploymen)Aiecision that does not result in a perfect or text book 
outcome. 
Second, and perhaps most important, the Court's reliance upon the "special 
relationship" doctrine used by Alabama Supreme Court's probably erodes the doctrine that 
a fire (or police) department owes no duty to a particular individual. Under the rapidly 
developing "special duty" or "special relationship" doctrine police or fire department can, by 
the conduct of its employees, create a duty to aid or protect a particular individual. 
The courts are not in agreement on what it takes to create a special duty or 
relationship. Generally, cases on that subject require conduct on the part of the public safety 
personnel that arise to the level of a promise to help or protect a particular individual, and 
reliance by that individual on that promise. Other cases add a requirement that the 
individual claiming injury through the breach of the promise to help or protect must have 
suffered the injury while in the physical custody, or control of, public safety personnel. 
However, this case suggests that a special duty or relationship can be created very easily, 
possibly by little more than the promise of help or protection created by the existence of a 
public safety department. 
How far these two related avenues of recovery will be expanded remains to be seen. 
However, wise municipalities will consider that City of Henderson puts them on notice that 
if they maintain and operate municipal fire and police services, the firemen and policemen 
whose duty it is to respond to calls for help or protection must respond skillfully and 
proficiently. If they do not, the municipality which employs them might be held liable under 
the Tennessee Tort Liability Act for injuries arising from their negligent response. 
For Further Information 
For further information on the Tennessee Tort Liability Act, please contact Sid Hemsley, 
Senior Legal Consultant in Knoxville at (615) 974-5301, or your MTAS Legal Consultant. 
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